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Memory and Photography: Rethinking Postcolonial Trauma Studies 
Katherine Isobel Baxter 
 
Recent scholarship in trauma and postcolonial studies has called for more wide-
ranging and at the same time more specific paradigms in trauma theory, to 
accommodate the complexities of trauma evidenced in postcolonial writing. The 
work of sociologist Kai Erikson provides a useful model for unpacking the diachronic 
nature of postcolonial trauma, and for acknowledging the multiple social fractures 
that trauma inflicts. In a case-study demonstrating Erikson’s applicability, I show 
how common tropes of trauma narrative are used as more than an adherence to 
convention in Marinovich and Silva’s memoir, The Bang Bang Club, which recounts 
the experiences of white South African photographers covering Soweto’s hostel war 
in the early 1990s. These narrative strategies produce a space of non-resolution in 
which the trauma of violence and witnessing can appear. 
 
Keywords: South Africa; trauma theory; postcolonial studies; photography; 
narrative; The Bang Bang Club 
 
In 2008 Stef Craps and Gert Buelens edited a special edition of Studies in the Novel, 
whose focus was “Postcolonial Trauma Novels”. The various essays of this collection 
provide an interesting snapshot of how contemporary trauma theory and postcolonial 
studies have been mapped onto each other in recent scholarship, and of some of the 
problems with such mapping. One key issue identified in the volume, as Michael 
Rothberg points out in his concluding essay, is the “need to supplement the event-
based model of trauma that has become dominant over the past fifteen years with a 
model that can account for ongoing, everyday forms of traumatizing violence as well” 
(226). This is not new. As Rothberg and others point out, Fanon, in The Wretched of 
the Earth (1961), had already recognized the reality of trauma in response to ongoing 
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experiences of colonial war. However, Rothberg indicates that despite Fanon’s 
delineation of “ongoing, everyday forms” of trauma, trauma theory has, in recent 
years, failed to respond to the problem sufficiently. 
Another issue identified in Craps and Buelens’ volume is the failure of critical 
models to account for the variety of experiences of, and responses to, traumatic 
events, whether singular or ongoing. Critical assumptions about how responses to 
trauma manifest themselves and how they can be addressed have been similarly 
limited. Ana Miller, for example, in her analysis of Achmat Dangor’s Bitter Fruit, 
draws attention to the difficulties of applying “generalized models of trauma” to 
individual and collective experiences (147). She highlights the situation of the novel’s 
character Lydia, who chooses not to testify to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (T.R.C.) about her rape by a white policeman because she sees no value 
in such testimony. Lydia’s choice challenges the common assumption upon which the 
work of the T.R.C. in part rested: that recounting events to an audience is therapeutic. 
Miller reads this choice more specifically as “an act of resistance against the 
appropriation of her personal trauma: Lydia refuses to allow her experience to be 
subsumed into institutional frameworks that deal with the past in superficial and 
problematic ways” (148). 
The problematic assumption that trauma can be modelled in generalized ways 
is echoed by certain structural assumptions about how trauma is figured in literature. 
Robert Eaglestone, in the same volume, provides an essentially formalist comparison 
between holocaust literature and contemporary African trauma literature. He points 
out the similarities in the tropes of narration that characterize the two groups of texts. 
In doing so Eaglestone indicates the paradigmatic position of holocaust literature in 
the field of trauma literature more generally, showing how African trauma literature 
conforms to the formal tropes of holocaust literature. Eaglestone suggests that, 
consciously or not, the formal techniques of trauma narrative, exemplified in 
holocaust literature, have influenced the shaping of African trauma literature, 
particularly that which markets itself to “a Western audience” (77). Eaglestone does 
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not challenge the application of this structural paradigm per se but his discussions 
point out the ways in which both psychoanalysis and European trauma literature have 
prescribed acceptable modes of presenting trauma within literary and therapeutic 
frameworks. This prescription potentially closes off other modes of presenting 
trauma, a limitation which can be as problematic as the limited assumptions, noted 
above, about how trauma manifests itself.1 
Implicit in many of these discussions is a tension between a desire for greater 
specificity in the use of the term “trauma” on the one hand, and broader temporal and 
contextual applications of the term on the other. Although these two desires may seem 
contradictory they in fact reflect the conflicted experience of trauma itself that trauma 
theory seeks to articulate. Mairi Emma Neeves presents the example of E. Ann 
Kaplan, who initially experienced a flourishing of communality in the United States 
in the aftermath of 9/11, only to feel an increased alienation from media coverage of 
that communality and resultantly from her own responses to the event themselves 
(110; Kaplan 17). Neeves explains that “Kaplan highlights how the collective 
response failed to encapsulate all the different subject positions, particularly 
‘forgetting’ to address the perspectives of those who did not fit with the specific idea 
of national identity being projected at that time” (110). “Kaplan suggests”, Neeves 
continues, “that the fiction of a unified response separated different people rather than 
bringing them together and that this contributed to an identity crisis within the nation” 
(110; Kaplan 18). The desire for media journalism to present a more inclusive and 
differentiated account of the variety of responses to trauma corresponds to the desire 
for more wide-ranging and at the same time more specific notations in trauma theory 
that we find expressed in many of the essays gathered in Postcolonial Trauma Novels. 
Rothberg is more accurate than he perhaps realizes in his claim that little has 
been done to address these needs in the past fifteen years. In 1994 Kai Erikson’s A 
New Species of Trouble: Explorations in Disaster, Trauma, and Community 
addressed many of these same issues. Erikson goes unmentioned in the essays 
considered here; however, his analysis of communal trauma is particularly pertinent. 
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In A New Species of Trouble Erikson presents various cases of social trauma ranging 
from the anxiety that followed the nuclear emergency of Three Mile Island, to the 
long-term impact of commercial chemical spills in First Nations regions, to the 
position and exclusion of the homeless in US society. Erikson explains that there is a 
significant difference between “those disasters that can be understood as works of 
nature and those that need to be understood as the work of humankind” (19). This has 
particular pertinence to discussions of postcolonial trauma literature where the 
designation “postcolonial” almost invariably infers manmade trauma as opposed to a 
natural disaster of some kind. Furthermore, Erikson asks what would happen if 
“instead of classifying a condition as trauma because it was induced by disaster, we 
would classify the event as disaster if it had the property of bringing about traumatic 
reactions.” (20) Under such a rubric, Erikson continues, “we would be required to 
include events that have the capacity to induce trauma but that do not have the 
suddenness or explosiveness normally associated with the term” (20).2 Once again this 
realignment of trauma and disaster bears particular relevance for the kinds of 
diagnoses that Rothberg and others read in Fanon’s critique of the colonial wars in 
Algeria, and for the consideration of trauma in colonial and postcolonial contexts 
more generally. Here the evidence of trauma is read back onto its cause to diagnose 
the nature of that cause. This allows for larger events, even infrastructural systems 
such as apartheid, to be considered as causes of trauma in terms that go beyond 
specific instances of mental or physical assault. Thus, long-term endurance of racial 
segregation or long-term exposure to the threat of abuse could also be classified as 
traumatic. 
Elsewhere, Erikson singles out four principle findings in his study over the 
past thirty years of disaster and its resultant traumas. The first is that within 
communities there are collective and individual traumas that occur as a result of 
disaster, whether that disaster is a specific event, such as a particular act of violence, 
or something more ongoing, such as the outbreak of disease or a toxic leak. The 
second is that disasters caused by something unseen (such as a toxin) make the 
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experience of trauma more severe. Thirdly, he reiterates the point that the experience 
of trauma is conditioned in part by whether or not the cause of the disaster is deemed 
natural or manmade. Moreover, he notes that the experience of trauma increases for 
those who feel they are perceived as overreacting or responding in an unreasonable 
way (as when, for example, “companies responsible for an emergency are called upon 
to defend themselves […] but try to belittle the claims of the plaintiffs” [Convery, et 
al., xiii]). Finally, and relatedly, he notes that a resulting sense of betrayal can lead to 
a “traumatic worldview”, which perceives the world suspiciously as operating “in 
ways of which we have no knowledge and over which we have no control” (Convery 
et al., xiii). 
Erikson’s second and third features are particularly applicable to postcolonial 
conditions of trauma. As already noted, his differentiation between natural and 
manmade disasters contributes helpfully to our understanding of colonial and 
postcolonial traumas. Indeed, one way in which colonizers often attempted to mask 
the destructive effect of their presence was by naturalizing the discourse of colonial 
enterprise along Darwinian lines. Such naturalized discourse continued through 
decolonization in the twentieth century where the incapacity for self-governance was 
cited as something inherent rather than the product of divisive colonial infrastructures 
of governance. Erikson’s attention to the acute trauma of an invisible threat also 
returns us to Fanon and his critique of internalized racism in Black Faces, White 
Masks. For Fanon, the trauma of such internalization comes about when the subject 
becomes aware of it. This awareness results in self-alienation: a distrust of the self, 
caused by a disjunction between external and internal experience. Such self-
alienation, which unsettles the stable self-image of the traumatised subject, comes to 
operate like an invisible threat, in that its source is no longer identifiable. Both act in 
undetectable ways to inflict a trauma of anxiety on an individual’s sense of self-
identity. The category of invisible threat might also extend to the experience of 
random violence, such as that fomented by the South African authorities in the final 
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years of apartheid as a way of supporting the argument of inherent incapacity for self-
governance noted above. 
While these connections may at first seem tenuous, further consideration of 
Erikson’s discussions of the trauma of the invisible threat demonstrate the similarities 
between the experiences of those in his study who are exposed to, or fear exposure to, 
invisible toxins, and those who suffer from the various comparably invisible traumas 
produced by colonialism and its aftermath. Noting that “technical experts seem to 
assume that increased experience and familiarity will act over time to reduce the 
dread and sense of mystery”, Erikson counters that “toxic emergencies really are 
different […] their capacity to induce a lasting sense of dread is one of their unique 
properties”, because, among other things, toxic emergencies “are not bounded, they 
have no frame” (146, 147). This is in contrast to the more usual Aristotelian 
perception of disaster as something with a plot, which has a beginning, middle and 
end (147). Whilst the toxic disaster may have a beginning, the ending never comes 
because there is a dread that toxic levels remain, or that the damage done by the 
toxins may still emerge in the future, resulting in a feeling of contamination (149). He 
refers to the suspected presence of the toxin in terms of “stealth” and “deception”, 
echoing the ways in which its potential victims perceive a willed malice in its 
presence (151). In his explanation, it is not the toxin itself that traumatizes so much as 
the continuous state of uncertain suspicion and anxiety that its threat induces. When 
nothing can put a stop to that suspicion and anxiety – when it becomes prolonged and 
without an end in sight – it becomes traumatic. 
This situation parallels that of the colonial subject in Fanon’s model, whose 
powers of self-determination have been removed at the social level through colonial 
governance and at the individual level through the internalization of the coloniser’s 
racism. Moreover, as Fanon indicates, for the colonial subject or community it is the 
duration of experience as much as the experience itself that traumatizes. He refers to 
the cumulative effect of “harmful nervous stimuli” overstepping “a certain threshold”, 
at which point “the defensive attitudes of the natives give way and they then find 
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themselves crowding the mental hospitals” (201). Fanon suggests that from the 
colonizers’ perspective this is not a wholly undesirable situation: “There is thus 
during this calm period of successful colonization a regular and important mental 
pathology which is the direct product of oppression” (201). One reason why such a 
situation is not wholly undesirable is because the violent responses of such trauma 
tend to be contained within the communities of the colonized rather than aimed at the 
colonizers directly (247-49). 
This leads us back to Erikson’s differentiation between individual and 
communal trauma. While Miller and Neeves in their respective articles argue that 
current models of trauma fail to accommodate the variety of individual responses to 
trauma that novels like Dangor’s Bitter Fruit present, Erikson has shown that in fact 
this variety of responses is a key element in characterizing trauma itself. For Erikson, 
this variety is less a challenge to theorising trauma and more a crucial symptom by 
which trauma is diagnosed within the community. In fact, this variety of response can 
itself be traumatic, in that the disparities of feeling and reaction within communities 
create another kind of alienation and isolation. Schematising the kinds of experiences 
that Kaplan testifies to in her account of the aftermath of 9/11, he explains that rather 
than creating what Martha Wolfenstein refers to as a “post-disaster utopia” (where 
communities are united by shared experience), manmade disasters “seem to force 
open whatever fault lines once ran silently through the structure of the larger 
community, dividing it into divisive fragments” (236).3 Furthermore, he suggests that 
as such, despite the fissure of communities in response to traumatic circumstances, in 
time this divisiveness comes to characterize the community, supplying a “prevailing 
mood” and dominating the community’s “sense of self” (237). The experience of 
division and alienation becomes a shared one, without being a unifying one. 
Erikson’s model recalls Fanon’s delineation of communities divided against 
each other under colonial rule. Fanon speaks of how members of colonized 
communities “tend to use each other as a screen, and each hides from his neighbour 
the national enemy [i.e. the colonizer]” (248). He continues that for “a colonized man, 
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in a context of oppression like that of Algeria, living does not mean embodying moral 
values or taking his place in the coherent and fruitful development of the world. To 
live means to keep on existing” (249). This bracketing out of the colonized from “the 
coherent and fruitful development of the world” is a traumatic one that places such 
development not only indefinitely on hold, but also outside of their control. This 
situation corresponds to Erikson’s summary of the “traumatic worldview”, which 
perceives the world as operating “in ways of which we have no knowledge and over 
which we have no control”, and which he sees as stemming from the divisions in 
communities that follow disaster (Convery, et al., xiii). Indeed, Erikson himself points 
out that this situation is one that can happen “to whole regions, even whole 
countries”, where “sustained dread and dislocation” can damage “a whole people” 
(237).4 
Erikson’s explorations of trauma, in A New Species of Trouble and elsewhere, 
clearly present possible ways to bridge the apparent impasses facing studies of trauma 
in postcolonial literature today. By reading Erikson alongside Fanon we can see how 
these models allow us to interpret the traumatic impact of colonialism in ways that go 
beyond the Aristotelian requirements for trauma to be event-based, specifiable, and 
coherent in effect. In what follows I intend to show how this model provides a useful 
paradigm for reading a more recent publication, Greg Marinovich and Joao Silva’s 
memoir The Bang-Bang Club: Snapshots from a Hidden War. The book serves as a 
useful case-study for several reasons: as a work of non-fiction it displays little 
pretence to literary aestheticism, however it still exhibits the four main tropes that 
Eaglestone proposes as common characteristics inherited from Holocaust literature by 
contemporary trauma writing: “the use of discourse usually seen as historical, diverse 
and complex narrative framing devices, moments of epiphany, and confused time 
schemes” (79). These characteristic tropes enable authors of trauma literature to 
convey the emotionally disruptive experience of trauma as historical reality. 
Furthermore, as a work that recounts in a documentary style the documentary work of 
photographers, it challenges Dominick LaCapra’s prioritisation of fictional methods 
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over documentary ones in conveying the affect of trauma to a reading audience (13). 
Indeed, what I draw attention to is the fact that the alienating effect of documentary 
reproduces the very sense of social fracture and alienation inherent in the experience 
of trauma, to which Erikson draws attention. As such the book provides a useful 
example of how literary works, whether fictional or non-fictional, respond to and 
reflect the characteristics of trauma that Fanon and Erikson explore. In demonstrating 
this I hope to indicate ways in which to rethink and to resolve the current tension 
between a desire for greater specificity and for broader application in theoretical 
approaches to trauma in postcolonial literature. 
 
I noted earlier that one source of Kaplan’s sense of alienation following 9/11 was the 
homogenizing of responses to the disaster presented by the media. These 
representations fed back to their audience a distorted view of themselves: one which 
told them that they were united and yet which presented only a partial image, notably 
excluding the presence of Arabs and Muslims (17-18). Kaplan’s experience highlights 
not only the problems for those who found themselves reflected in this distorted and 
alienating representation, but also gestures towards the place of the media in the 
mediation of trauma more generally. 
The representation of traumatic events by media journalism is ubiquitous and 
yet attention is rarely given to the experiences of journalists themselves. Their role is 
often one of silent mediation so that, even when a journalist writes or speaks, the 
common demand placed upon them is for a self-effacing stance of objectivity. This 
self-effacement allows them to become proxies for their audience so that whilst their 
witnessing-as-proxy makes these events more immediate it also allows their audience 
to remain at one remove from the witnessed events. Such self-effacement is all the 
more complete for photojournalists, who do not speak and are, necessarily, behind the 
camera. 
This role as proxy for the viewing audience is a fraught one: the photographer 
is caught between an ethical and a financial obligation to supply apparently objective 
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images to his or her audience (who after all buy these images), and a humanitarian 
obligation to the subject of their photography. Objectivity is what allows the story to 
be told but this frequently relies upon a suspension of the impulse to intervene. The 
photographer, for example, refrains from intervention in order to shoot a picture that 
may inspire others to intervene. However, confusion occurs when the audience, 
moved by the potency of the image, is then angered by the apparent detachment of the 
photographer, despite the fact that such detachment is what has given the photograph 
its potent effect. What remains unexamined in this mediation is the potential trauma 
that such witnessing inflicts on the mediating journalist. However, recent research 
concerning the psychological effects of war reportage on journalists working in 
conflict zones indicates that they are at far greater risk of suffering from P.T.S.D. 
(post-traumatic stress disorder) than journalists operating outside conflict zones, and 
that of the various professions of journalism, photographers are more likely than any 
other to suffer from P.T.S.D. (Feinstein and Owen 51). 
In their memoir The Bang-Bang Club: Snapshots of a Hidden War, Greg 
Marinovich and Joao Silva recount the events and traumatic impact of their time as 
photographers covering the violence known as the Hostel War, which engulfed 
townships in the years leading up to South Africa’s 1994 elections. Their account 
attests to the ways in which the remit to witness but to refrain from engagement 
induces a sense of inadequacy that takes its toll on journalists exposed repeatedly to 
violent or dangerous situations.5 
Erikson points out that the term trauma has evolved a double meaning. In 
strict medical terms it refers to a blow that inflicts some disturbance either to the body 
or the mind; it is the act of violence itself not its effect. Yet in common usage trauma 
refers to the response to such a blow: what it subsequently does to the person who is 
its victim (288-89). It is clear that these two uses of the word are equally applicable to 
the memories that persist for Marinovich, Silva, and others in their profession. 
Feinstein notes that many of the interviewees in his studies of P.T.S.D. among war 
correspondents can recall specific events “with little hesitation, from a decade-long 
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catalog” (Feinstein 21, 22). Such events fall into three categories: a near-death 
experience (the most common); the loss of a colleague; or an image of “the plight of 
the distraught”, that is to say the traumatized survivors of violence (Feinstein 21). 
These events when they occur are moments of experience that break in upon the 
journalists’ previous sense of inviolability, showing up the vulnerability and 
impotence of the journalists’ status. The continued sense of that vulnerability and 
impotence becomes a symptom of the trauma that the journalists endure as a result of 
their experience. 
Marinovich links this sense of powerlessness to the mechanics of photography 
itself. Remembering his work with Silva in 1992 covering the famine in Somalia he 
recalls: “I had felt utterly impotent as I took pictures of a starving father as he realized 
that his last living child had died on his lap, watching him through the lens as he 
closed her eyes and then walked away” (153). The success of the picture, as 
Marinovich implies, relies upon a mechanization of the photographer, his ability to 
switch off his humanity and see through a lens. The camera here has the capacity to 
decontextualize not only those captured as an image but also the photographer who is 
made impotent by the mechanics of his job. He concludes that, “there is a price 
extracted with every such frame: some of the emotion, the vulnerability, the empathy 
that makes us human, is lost every time the shutter is released” (153). 
As I have already noted, although The Bang-Bang Club does not make any 
claims for its own literary merit, as a memoir it fulfils many of the formal 
characteristics that Eaglestone sees as the legacy of holocaust literature to trauma 
literature (79). Taking the use of historical discourse first, The Bang-Bang Club, like 
holocaust literature, offers various metatextual addenda that both establish historical 
context and in the case of The Bang-Bang Club make evident the volume’s status as 
non-fiction. These include a “South African Timeline” starting in 1910 with the 
formation of the Union of South Africa; a glossary of terms and acronyms; a 
bibliography; an index; and a Forward by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. These addenda 
aim to situate the main body of the text in historical, geographical and social context. 
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In doing so they modulate the “I” of the text’s narrating voice, placing it within a 
larger web of information. Within the main text, further dates and facts are given that 
tie the narrative into various national and personal histories. For example, chapters 
regularly open with a specific date, allowing the reader to synchronize the events 
narrated in the main body of the text with those given in the “South African 
Timeline”. 
Recalling Eaglestone’s second criterion, these dates are just one of the 
narrative framing devices that mark the opening of each chapter, and the main body of 
the text more generally. These devices create a polyphonic effect that once again 
relativizes the authority of the first person singular of the main narration. Following 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s Forward, each chapter takes a title heading. Many of 
these are quotations representing voices from both the communities they 
photographed and the community of photographers with whom they worked.6 The 
chapters are also given epigraphs taken from traditional Acholi funeral songs, press 
photograph captions, fiction, township and hostel residents, as well as quotations from 
other photographers. These insertions operate paratactically to indicate the direction 
that the chapters will take. But this parataxis also creates polyphony by presenting 
several perspectives at once. This polyphony operates synchronically through the 
juxtaposition of voices at the opening of the chapters. However, it also operates 
diachronically as words spoken in one context or timeframe take on new resonances 
through acts of recollection or by being intentionally juxtaposed with accounts of 
future or past events. 
This polyphony has the effect of drawing attention to the authorial voice. 
Highlighting the first person singular narrative voice as one amongst many, the text 
gestures towards other, potentially conflicting versions of, and responses to, the 
events described. In their Preface, the authors discuss their need to accommodate 
multiple voices, and to acknowledge the contradictions of narrating the memories of 
multiple lives, including those of the dead. They note the “complexity inherent in 
telling the story of four people who […] had very different lives and experiences”, 
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and admit, “We can never hope to know what goes on in the minds of even the closest 
of intimates” (xiii). Although the book is ostensibly narrated by Marinovich, he and 
Silva explain that “One person never sees enough to be able to pull together a book of 
this nature”, concluding that their collaboration was essential (xiii). 
Both Miller and Neeves highlight the way recent South African fiction, such 
as Dangor’s Bitter Fruit, employs “multiple characters as focalizers” for narrative 
(Neeves 116). Miller suggests that such imaginative juxtapositions allow fiction 
writers to articulate the sort of “ex-centric” perspectives that Ato Quayson argues are 
needed to re-evaluate the normativities of postcolonial history (147).7 She goes further 
to suggest that these imaginative representations give “a ‘feel’ for the subjective, 
intersubjective, and cultural dimensions of trauma and memory that factual accounts 
are less able to capture” (148). Miller’s description here consciously echoes 
LaCapra’s evaluation of fiction as capable of “giving at least a plausible ‘feel’ for 
experience and emotion which may be difficult to arrive at through restricted 
documentary methods” (13). Both Miller and LaCapra imagine an empathetic 
connection between reader and fictional character that cuts across the potentially 
alienating objectivity of facts. However, what both overlook is the mimetic power 
latent in the alienating qualities of documentary methods. The alienation of empathy 
that documentary methods can entail reproduces in the reader an experience that 
parallels the alienation inherent in experiences of trauma. LaCapra is right to suggest 
that the reader does not, indeed cannot, necessarily empathise with the subject’s 
experience of alienation caused by the trauma that the documentary records. This 
failure of empathy, however, creates an experience for the reader which mimics that 
of the traumatised, alienated subject, since the reader is excluded and alienated from 
the pathos of the subject. As a result, this quality of the documentary genre, in fact, 
ensures the “empathic unsettlement” which LaCapra insists upon from the start (xi). 
The reader’s “unsettlement” or alienation is not that of the subject’s, but it enables an 
appreciation of the subject’s alienation and the reader’s distance from it. 
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Whilst Marinovich and Silva do not present the kind of formal historiography 
with which LaCapra seeks to contrast fiction here, their memoir, like their 
photography, is essentially documentary. Interiority is limited to their own 
experiences or what they can reasonably extrapolate from conversations, diaries, and 
memories of the individuals they present. Furthermore, the authors frequently draw 
attention to the limitations of their knowledge of their peers; the narrator states at one 
point: “I would catch myself looking at Gary [Bernard] and wondering what was 
going on in his mind […] it was only later that we understood the full effect that the 
accumulated trauma was having on him.” (54) This emphasis on limits reflects their 
interactions with, as well as isolation from, each other. For example, the suicide of 
Gary Bernard prompts Marinovich to recall his decision, following an earlier suicide 
attempt, to withdraw from him: “I had decided that I would not help Gary any more, I 
could not do any more for him” (216). Hearing of Bernard’s death Marinovich finds 
that whilst “in that make-believe rehearsal [of a response to a successful suicide 
attempt by Bernard] I felt I could justify my withdrawal […] I still felt like shit.” 
(216) 
The experiential qualities of the events that Marinovich and Silva narrate are 
governed by a disconnectedness that both inflicts trauma, by dissociating them from 
their environment (their family, friends, homes, workplaces, and photographic 
subjects), and is symptomatic of that infliction. The limitations of documentary 
methods thus come to mirror the disconnectedness that they document. Indeed, such 
mirroring reproduces the protagonists’ experience of disconnection for the reader. The 
multiple perspectives that the chapter headings and epigraphs give voice to do not, in 
the end, provide a more complete view of the events and experiences described. They 
remain “ex-centric”, competing and unresolved, but as such they are paradoxically 
more able to communicate the trauma of disconnection that the book attempts to 
convey. 
The confused time schemes that Eaglestone notes as another recurrent motif of 
holocaust literature are also evident in The Bang-Bang Club. These disruptions in the 
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otherwise linear chronology of the book correspond with the psychological ruptures 
of time that characterize flashbacks and other symptoms of trauma. Following the 
book’s Forward and Preface, the first chapter opens on 18 April 1994, with 
Marinovich looking through his camera at a terrified National Peace-Keeping Force 
soldier firing into a hostel: “I wanted to capture that fear. The next minute, a blow 
struck me – massive, hammer-like – in the chest. I missed a sub-moment, a beat from 
my life, and then I found myself on the ground” (1). The moment in which 
Marinovich and Ken Oosterbroek are shot, with which the book opens, sends the 
authors back to the morning of the same day and then, in the following chapter, to 
August 1990 when they started to work on covering the Hostel War. The book thus 
spirals out from the moment of Marinovich’s wounding, a moment in which he feels 
suddenly he can finally “atone for the dozens of close calls that always left someone 
else injured or dead, while I emerged […] pictures in hand, having committed the 
crime of being the lucky voyeur” (2). This sense of atonement for the crime of luck 
underpins the book and is embodied in this moment when he finally catches a bullet. 
This moment also comes to act as the book’s initial narrative denouement in 
Chapter 14. However, once again an ex-centric force throws the narrative back out 
into a spiral of return through the final six chapters. The book ends, not in 1994, but 
in 1999 when Silva and Marinovich visit the home of one of the National Peace-
Keeping Force soldiers who had been present on the day that Marinovich and 
Oosterbroek were shot. The frustration caused by the failure of an inquest into 
Oosterbroek’s death to confirm that he and Marinovich were shot by the peacekeepers 
is finally laid to rest when the soldier, talking to them in the privacy of his car, 
stiltingly admits: “I think somewhere, one of us, the bullet that killed your brother – it 
came from us” (225). 
The narrative recurrence of the shooting acts as a structuring focal point 
around which temporal events circle. The book’s chronology is made to loop back to 
this moment as something both in and out of time; a moment whose significance 
changes through its repetition. This structural device is echoed in the book’s use of 
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photographs. Although a result of standard book binding techniques, the disjunction 
between these photographs, bound in sections sporadically through the book, and the 
relevant narrative passages disrupts the book’s chronology. Narrated events recur in 
visual form several pages later and vice versa. Moreover, the clustering of these 
images reinforces the tension between their similarities and differences: each is 
distinct, and yet a cumulative force emerges from their very distinctness. These visual 
clusters act as further framing devices, presenting yet other, unvoiced perspectives on 
the events of the text. 
One might also read these images as standing in for the moments of epiphany 
that Eaglestone presents as his third characteristic of Holocaust literature (79). They 
offer an instantaneous vision that seems to bring to life the events documented. But 
they also freeze these events: they are not lively but static. They capture a moment 
and imprison in two dimensions what was temporal and three-dimensional. Thus they 
also record the moment of trauma itself and act, like memories, as persistent markers 
of a past that persists troublingly into the present. The image isolates the visual 
elements of the moment from those beyond the frame, detaching them, and 
reproducing them in new and potentially unrelated contexts. This recalls the P.T.S.D. 
symptoms identified by Feinstein amongst photographers and other journalists for 
whom images return unsought. 
Marinovich remembers a recurrent nightmare that haunted Kevin Carter’s 
dreams: 
 
In the dream, he was near death, lying on the ground, crucified to a 
wooden beam, unable to move. A television camera with a massive 
lens zoomed closer and closer in on his face, until Kevin would wake 
up screaming […] It was all that he imagined our subjects must feel 
towards us in their last moments as we documented their deaths. (55) 
 
In a variation of the dream Kevin was the photographer and the victim would grab for 
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him, “holding him captive with bloody hands” (55). Kevin’s dream telescopes the 
horror of the photographer and his subject, in a moment of traumatic recognition and 
isolation. Kevin’s dream can be read as an epiphany but it is not one that can herald 
change. Like photographs, these unsought recurrences of moments past reappear 
disruptively without necessarily imparting any redemptive understanding. 
The act of photography in Kevin’s dream becomes a nightmarish version of 
what LaCapra refers to as “empathic unsettlement”, whereby the witness put himself 
“in the other’s position while recognizing the difference of that position and hence not 
taking the other’s place” (78). In his dream Kevin over-identifies with those he 
photographs but this occurs against his will. We might understand this in LaCapra’s 
terms of “acting out” (70). However, this does not negate the ambiguous quality of 
“empathic unsettlement” that clings to the act of photography and the photograph 
itself. When Marinovich claims, at the opening of the book, that he “wanted to 
capture that fear” that he senses among the peace-keepers, he does not imply that he 
wants to feel that fear himself. The camera interposes itself between him and the 
soldiers’ fear, a mediator, as it were, of empathic unsettlement. The camera and its 
photograph appear to erase and yet actually ensure the difference of position, the 
inability to inhabit the other’s place, which LaCapra demands. 
LaCapra’s demand for an observance of difference is all the more loaded for 
the four white photographers at the centre of The Bang-Bang Club. As white South 
African males, their social and political privilege is evident. Although witnessing the 
same events as the black South Africans of the Soweto townships where they worked, 
their responses are, and are expected to be, different as a result of that privilege. Of 
course, there is also the significant difference that they were, at least in theory, 
witnesses of, as opposed to willing or unwilling participants in, the violence they 
photographed. Implicit in at least some of the criticism that the book received on 
publication is a judgment that, as white professional males, their trauma counts for 
less than, or can only count as part of, the larger national trauma of the final violent 
days of Apartheid.8 Indeed, the book incorporates an example of such a critique in the 
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comments of Distance, a member of an A.N.C. self-defence unit who they meet in an 
area where a fellow photographer had been shot a month earlier. When they mention 
him, Distance replies: “I am not sorry your friend Abdul was killed. It is good that 
one of you dies. Nothing personal, but now you feel what is happening to us every 
day” (129). There is no answer to this, but the acuteness of Distance’s words does not 
undo the reality of the photographers’ own trauma that results from their experience 
of witnessing. 
If the authors are separated from their subjects by the privileges of their skin 
colour, they are also separated from their neighbours and even from their loved ones 
by the experiences of their work. Marinovich recalls a regular Sunday morning in 
which he and his neighbours engage in the familiar ritual of cleaning the car. But 
whilst his neighbours are sprucing up their cars for the weekend, Marinovich is 
“grimly trying to wash someone’s brain out of the cloth upholstery of my back seat” 
where a man had died the day before as Marinovich tried to rush him to hospital 
through the Soweto streets (52). Marinovich’s resentment of his neighbours and the 
“simple dirt” of their cars recalls Erikson’s description of how trauma can divide 
communities: “The sense that others do not fully appreciate what is happening to one 
can easily ripen into a feeling of having been let down, of having been left out of the 
human community, even of having been betrayed” (Convery, et al., xiii). Explaining 
the emergence of formerly hidden fault lines within communities, he notes that these 
usually “divide the people affected by the event from the people spared” (236). 
Marinovich feels as if his neighbours “were occupying a different planet”, because he 
is unable to explain to them that he is cleaning brains from his car upholstery: “when 
we tried to discuss those little telling details from incidents in the townships with 
people who had never experienced them, the usual response was either disgust or 
uncomprehending stares” (53). This frustration is matched by the realization that, 
“despite our attempts to tell the truth, through our reporting and in our captions, our 
pictures played an unwitting part in the deception” of the South African government: 
while these pictures showed the uniformed white policemen apparently investigating 
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the violence, they could not show “that they had arrived hours after the emergency 
call for help [… and] the absolute certainty of the survivors” of the security force’s 
involvement (58-59). The shared sense of frustration and alienation creates a 
corresponding sense of fragile community between these photographers, of the kind 
that Erikson outlines in his conclusion to A New Species of Trouble. These men 
remain divided, willingly and unwillingly, from each other and from the communities 
around them. The experience of this division is alienating yet that experience of 
alienation is one that is held in common, one that creates a tentative bond of 
understanding. 
In their book Marinovich and Silva utilize the kind of formal tropes that 
Eaglestone proposes are common to holocaust literature (“historical, diverse and 
complex narrative framing devices, moments of epiphany, and confused time 
schemes” [79]), not because they are consciously or unconsciously borrowing from 
this literature but because these particular tropes allow the authors to convey a sense 
of the disruptive affect of traumatic experience. At the heart of their presentation lies 
the issue of disconnection, which appears both as trauma-inducing and as a 
consequence of trauma. This disconnection operates at various levels within what we 
might see as a matrix of trauma, even contributing to LaCapra’s concept of “empathic 
unsettlement” and its need for a recognition of difference. Indeed, in the light of 
Erikson’s discussions, this disconnectedness, the multiplicity of experiences and 
responses, need not be seen as somehow undermining theoretical frameworks for 
comprehending trauma. This disconnectedness is demonstrably an implicit part of the 
matrix of trauma and as such, its recognition within trauma scholarship allows us to 
speak of trauma both more comprehensively and more precisely. 
 
Notes 
1. See also Schaffer, Kay and Sidonie Smith. Human Rights and Narrated Lives: The 
Ethics of Recognition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 19-23. 
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2. Erikson is quoting here from his earlier book, Everything in its Path: Destruction of 
Community in the Buffalo Creek Flood. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976. 
3. Wolfenstein, Martha. Disaster: A Psychological Essay. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 
1957. Cited in Erikson (236). 
4. Erikson gives the example of Communist Romania. 
5. We might note similar feelings expressed by those bearing witness to victim 
testimonials. See Krog, Antjie. Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow, and the Limits of 
Forgiveness in the New South Africa. New York: Three Rivers Press. 51.  
8. For example, Chapter 2 bears the title “Ah, A Pondo – He Deserved to Die”, and an 
epigraph from a “traditional Acholi funeral song”, “Death has killed the happiest / 
Death has killed the happiest / Death has killed the great one that I trusted” (4);  
Chapter 14 is called “Show us your Dead”, and has an epigraph from Ken 
Oosterbroek’s diary, “I hope I die with the best fucking news pic of all time on my 
neg. – it wouldn’t be worth it otherwise . . . ” (154). 
7. See Quayson, Ato. “Symbolisation Compulsions: Freud, African Literature and 
South Africa’s Process of Truth and Reconciliation”. Cambridge Quarterly 30.3 
(2001): 191-214. 
8. For example see Creen, Mike. “Snapshots of a Hidden War”. The Christchurch Press 
(23rd February 2002): 16. 
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